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Setting aside arbitral awards in
Singapore: due process and good
faith obligations
Mark Campbell*
A B S T R A C T
The Singapore Court of Appeal in CMNC v Jaguar Energy has offered clarification on
what it identified as an ‘important area of arbitration law’: ie the correct approach to al-
leged violations of due process by tribunals in their management of the arbitral procedure.
The case involved setting aside proceedings in the context of a complex dispute further com-
plicated by the parties’ prior agreement for an expedited procedure. The Court of Appeal
judgment takes a robust approach towards alleged due process violations. It emphasizes that
the matter must be assessed according to a test of reasonableness and fairness with careful
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reference to the circumstances, and that courts should be cautious about interfering with a
tribunal’s decision-making where there is a rational basis for those decisions. But CMNC v
Jaguar Energy is notable for another reason: the presumption by the judge at first instance
that there was implied into the arbitration agreement an obligation to arbitrate in good
faith. That point may be of particular interest to those from common law jurisdictions where
a more general debate over the role of good faith obligations in commercial contracts per-
sists.
1 . I N T R O D U C T I O N
Arbitral tribunals have considerable discretion when it comes to procedural matters,
including decisions relating to the disclosure of documents and the admissibility of
evidence. In taking procedural decisions, there will be a number of relevant factors to
consider as the tribunal attempts to balance the competing interests of the parties
with the need to ensure an award can be rendered in an efficient and expeditious
manner. But when might decisions by the tribunal violate due process and allow an
award to be set aside or enforcement refused? That was the question considered by
the Singapore Court of Appeal in China Machine New Energy Corp v Jaguar Energy
Guatemala LLC and another (CMNC v Jaguar Energy).1 The Court of Appeal’s judg-
ment makes it clear that the courts should be reluctant to interfere with the exercise
of the tribunal’s procedural discretion where there is a rational basis for the decisions
it has reached. The dispute in CMNC v Jaguar Energy had been referred to arbitration
following an acrimonious breakdown in the parties’ commercial relationship. In the
High Court (although not in the Court of Appeal), CMNC’s attempt to have the
award set aside was premised in part on its claim that Jaguar Energy breached its ob-
ligation to arbitrate in good faith and that the tribunal had failed to provide an ade-
quate response to Jaguar Energy’s conduct. The judge at first instance was prepared
to proceed on the basis that the parties were indeed subject to a duty to conduct the
arbitral proceedings in good faith.2
Having outlined the facts and then the High Court and Court of Appeal deci-
sions, this piece will focus on two aspects of CMNC v Jaguar Energy. One concerns
the ‘ratio’ of the Court of Appeal’s decision: ie the principles to be applied when con-
sidering whether due process has or has not been followed. The other point is the
obiter conclusion from the High Court that the parties were under an obligation to
act in good faith. While that conclusion will be uncontroversial for civilian lawyers, it
may attract the eye of lawyers in some common law jurisdictions (including
Singapore and England) where there is an ongoing debate over the role of good faith
in commercial contracts. Either way, the interesting questions are not so much about
the existence of an obligation to arbitrate in good faith but its utility.
2 . T H E F A C T S
The project giving rise to the parties’ dispute involved CMNC constructing a
power plant in Guatemala for Jaguar Energy. Two agreements were central to that
1 [2020] SGCA 12.
2 [2018] SGHC 101 [199].
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arrangement. One was the Engineering, Procurement and Construction Contract
(EPC Contract) executed in 2008; the other was the Deferred Payment Security
Agreement (DPSA) executed in 2009. Each agreement was governed by New York
law and provided for resolution of disputes by arbitration in Singapore under 1998
Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce. Of relevance to
the events that unfolded was the stipulation in Clause 20.2 of the EPC Contract
that the tribunal should render its award within 90 days of the third arbitrator hav-
ing been appointed; a period that could be extended by a further 90 days. Clause
20.2 also stated that the tribunal ‘shall endeavor to the extent possible to streamline
the proceedings and minimize the time and cost of the proceedings’.3 In 2013,
when CMNC failed to meet certain deadlines under the EPC Contract, Jaguar
Energy issued breach notices and reserved its right of termination. CMNC, in re-
sponse, attempted to exercise rights under the DPSA. Jaguar Energy then pur-
ported to terminate the EPC Contract and also claimed the DPSA was terminated
as a result. Jaguar Energy prevented access of CMNC’s employees to the construc-
tion site; a Guatemalan court order subsequently led to the eviction of CMNC
employees from the adjacent living quarters. As a result, CMNC no longer had ac-
cess to a range of documents that had been available in the site office. Jaguar
Energy also terminated CMNC’s access to an online document platform. It was,
moreover, alleged that Jaguar Energy seized two computers containing relevant
documents. In 2014 Jaguar Energy commenced arbitral proceedings against
CMNC, with Jaguar Energy claiming damages in compensation for its costs in
completing the project. The tribunal awarded Jaguar Energy the vast majority of
what it had claimed, with CMNC’s subsequent attempt to set aside the award
largely focussed on allegations that it had been unable to mount an appropriate re-
sponse to Jaguar Energy’s claim. It is also worth noting that parties agreed to ex-
tend the timeline for the arbitration beyond what had been originally agreed in
Clause 20.2.
3 . T H E H I G H C O U R T D E C I S I O N
In setting aside proceedings in the Singapore High Court, CMNC cited three of the
grounds contained in Article 34 of the UNCITRAL Model Law on International
Commercial Arbitration (Model Law) and also section 24 of Singapore’s
International Arbitration Act (award induced or affected by fraud or corruption;
breach of natural justice). The ‘Due Process Ground’ relying on Article 34(2)(a)(ii)
and section 24(b) concerned CMNC’s allegation that an attorney eyes only regime
(AEO Regime) prevented CMNC from presenting its case properly and also that
the tribunal did not consider CMNC’s arguments relating to the DPSA.4 The
‘Defective Arbitral Procedure Ground’ relying on Article 34(2)(a)(iv) involved two
allegations: the tribunal breached Article 18 (equal treatment of parties) of the
Model Law; and the tribunal did not respond appropriately to the breach by Jaguar
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Corruption Ground’ relying on Article 34(2)(b)(ii) and section 24(a) involved two
complaints: one, that Jaguar Energy had used guerrilla tactics; the other, that tribunal
had failed to investigate allegations of corruption and/or the award itself was affected
by corruption.6 Kannan Ramesh J rejected CMNC’s case in relation to each of those
three grounds and declined to set aside the award.
The High Court judgment is a relatively long one running to 232 paragraphs, but
in the context of this case note it is worth drawing attention to two things. The first
is the AEO Regime which the tribunal had imposed in relation to certain documents
to be disclosed by Jaguar Energy. That order allowed the documents in question to
be viewed only by CMNC’s counsel and, with permission of the tribunal, named
employees of CMNC for the purposes of giving instructions.7 The court held that
that the tribunal was empowered to make such an order under the applicable arbitra-
tion rules, albeit that it would have had those powers under Article 19(2) of the
Model Law.8 CMNC’s point was ‘not that the Tribunal had no power to grant an
AEO order, but that the order was made in an inappropriate and indiscriminate
way’.9 Although a common feature of litigation in the USA, the judge observed that
an AEO order was a procedural device ‘rare in international arbitration but . . . not
unheard of’.10
The second concerns the purported obligation to arbitrate in good faith. In the
High Court, CMNC had submitted that ‘the parties to an arbitration agreement
both bear an implied duty to arbitrate in good faith . . . [and that the] duty forms
part of the agreed arbitral procedure between the parties’.11 It was further submitted
that ‘Jaguar employed guerrilla tactics in the Arbitration that amount to a breach of
its duty to arbitrate in good faith and accordingly, a breach of the agreed arbitral pro-
cedure’.12 CMNC claimed that in failing ‘to restrain Jaguar’s bad faith conduct . . .
the Tribunal acted in breach of agreed arbitral procedure’.13 Four aspects of Jaguar
Energy’s conduct were offered in support of CMNC’s contention that the good faith
obligation had been breached. (i) Seizing the physical location where the power
plant was being constructed and terminating CMNC’s access to the online document
platform.14 (ii) Seizing documents by evicting CMNC’s employees.15 (iii)
Harassment of and interference with witnesses prior to the arbitration.16 (iv)
Disclosing documents in a disordered/delayed manner.17 Kannan Ramesh J, who
was willing to proceed on the basis that the parties were subject to a good faith obli-
gation in relation to the conduct of the arbitral proceedings, nevertheless rejected
6 ibid [215]–[230].
7 ibid [56].
8 ibid [133]. The applicable provision was Art 20(7) of the 1998 ICC Rules: ‘[the] Arbitral Tribunal may
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CMNC’s claim that Jaguar Energy’s conduct amounted to breach of the purported
good faith obligation.18
4 . T H E C O U R T O F A P P E A L D E C I S I O N
The Singapore Court of Appeal rejected the appeal by CMNC, although by that
stage CMNC’s case was focussed solely on the ‘Due Process Ground’. In the words
of Sundaresh Menon CJ, giving the judgment of the court:
The parties’ right to be heard finds expression in Art 18 of the Model Law,
which provides: The parties shall be treated with equality and each party shall
be given a full opportunity of presenting his case. This basic procedural guaran-
tee finds teeth in Art 34(2)(a)(ii) of the Model Law and s 24(b) of the IAA,
which provide, respectively, that the supervisory court may annul an award if
the party against whom the award is invoked was ‘unable to present his case’,
or where that party’s rights are prejudiced because a ‘breach of the rules of nat-
ural justice occurred in connection with the making of the award’. These provi-
sions permit, in certain circumstances, the setting aside of an award where the
procedural protections in Art 18 of the Model Law have not been duly
accorded to the award-debtor.19
The focus of the appeal was, therefore, the conduct of the tribunal and its
decision-making in relation to CMNC’s access to documents.20 Having examined in
detail the tribunal’s exercise of its discretion in the particular circumstances of the
dispute, the Court of Appeal rejected CMNC’s various complaints individually and
also cumulatively as a basis on which the award should be set aside.21
There are several principles central to the court’s analysis in deciding whether the
party in question was denied the opportunity to present its case. First, the phrase
‘full opportunity’ in Article 18 ML does not mean an ‘unlimited’ opportunity, but
rather that opportunity ‘is impliedly limited by considerations of reasonableness and
fairness’.22 Second, an assessment of whether that ‘full opportunity’ was denied ‘can
only be meaningfully answered within the specific context of the particular facts and
circumstances of each case’.23 Third, that assessment relies on a test of reasonable-
ness. The court must consider ‘what the tribunal did (or decided not to do) falls
within the range of what a reasonable and fair-minded tribunal in those circumstan-
ces might have done’.24 Fourth, the question of reasonableness and fairness is not to
be assessed in retrospect, but rather ‘the tribunal’s decisions can only be assessed by
reference to what was known to the tribunal at the time’.25 Fifth, one can note that
18 ibid [205]–[214].
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‘the court will accord a margin of deference to the tribunal in matters of procedure
and will not intervene simply because it might have done things differently’.26
An examination of the way the Court of Appeal applied those principles to each
of the various complaints made by CMNC is unnecessary here. However, the analy-
sis of the tribunal’s conduct in relation to the disclosure of certain sensitive docu-
ments is illustrative. The AEO Regime was put in place by the tribunal due to
concerns expressed by Jaguar Energy that information in certain documents would
enable CMNC to interfere with completion of the construction project. That AEO
Regime was then replaced by an order allowing documents to be disclosed to
CMNC’s employees in a redacted form, before being partially reinstated. It was even-
tually lifted in its entirety. It was claimed by CMNC that ‘the Tribunal’s management
of the disclosure process for sensitive documents was unfair, and amounted to a
breach of natural justice’27 and that CMNC ‘suffered prejudice in that its ability to
prepare its [case] was severely hindered’.28 The central issue was identified by the
Court of Appeal as follows:
The question is not whether the AEO Order had adversely impacted CMNC’s
preparation of its case – it almost certainly did, to some extent. The question
is whether the balance struck by the Tribunal in making the AEO Order as a
whole – between Jaguar’s interest in safeguarding the confidentiality of the
documents in order to prevent harm, and CMNC’s interest in being able to
prepare its case unhindered in any way – is one which was so unfair or unrea-
sonable as to fall outside the range of what a reasonable and fair-minded tribu-
nal might have done in the circumstances.29
CMNC was unable to demonstrate that ‘the restrictions on document production
imposed as a result of the AEO Regime (and its successors) had any direct impact
on CMNC’s preparations in the critical period leading to the submission of [an ex-
pert report] and the other quantum evidence’.30
5 . D U E P R O C E S S A N D E Q U A L T R E A T M E N T
Underpinning the Court of Appeal’s judgment is the aim of limiting ‘the opportunity
for those attempting to abuse the doctrine of due process’.31 Abuse of due process, it
is said, ‘undermines and cheapens the real importance of due process in international
arbitration’ and ‘can erode the legitimacy of arbitration as a whole and its critical role
as a mode of binding dispute resolution’.32 The decision by the Singapore Court of







32 ibid [3]. This paragraph of the judgment includes a reference to Lucy Reed, ‘Ab(use) of Due Process:
Sword vs Shield’ (2017) 33 Arb Int 361, 376.
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principles to be applied when considering whether a party has been denied an appro-
priate opportunity to present its case or prejudiced by some other breach of natural
justice. The Court of Appeal, for example, stated that the principles applicable to a
breach of natural justice ‘are well-established’.33 And it is clear from the judgment
that the relevant principles find support in pre-existing authorities from Singapore
and England, the views of prominent commentators, and also travaux préparatoires
of the Model Law.34 That said, a key responsibility of appeal courts is their role in
‘setting the tone for lower court decisions’.35 The Court of Appeal’s judgment is cer-
tainly clear in ‘setting the tone’ by emphasizing that courts in Singapore will be slow
to interfere with a tribunal’s discretion to manage the arbitral process. In this regard,
one can note the way the judgment cites with approval (at [103]) formulae from
previous authorities in Singapore (’either irrationally or capriciously’)36 and England
(’so far removed from what could reasonably be expected of the arbitral process that
it must be rectified’).37 It has, moreover, been stated explicitly that a court should ex-
ercise restraint even if it might have reached a different decision on the same set of
facts.38 Given the incommensurability of the various factors that will inform a tribu-
nal’s reasoning on procedural matters, there will in many cases be no single, right an-
swer. If, for example, an arbitral tribunal concludes there is good reason for ordering
disclosure of certain documents without any restrictions, that does not ‘necessarily’
mean that a differently constituted tribunal would act unreasonably in ordering dis-
closure of the same documents on an AEO-basis. The important point, it seems, is
that there must be some rational basis for the decision reached: ie the tribunal must
consider relevant factors of which it is aware and reach a decision giving proper
weight to those factors in a way that is fair to each party. It remains to be seen
whether AEO orders will become a more common feature of international commer-
cial arbitration. A former president of the ICC Court of International Arbitration (as
expert for CMNC) stated that while such orders are ‘not yet commonplace in ICC
arbitration, they are not unknown’.39 With obvious links to confidentiality and in-
terim measures, CMNC v Jaguar Energy suggests that an AEO order can, where ap-
propriate, provide an effective means of dealing with disclosure and evidence in a
way that protects a party’s commercial interests.
CMNC v Jaguar Energy also suggests that care is needed in the use of expedited or
fast track procedures. That parties are able to agree to an expedited procedure
reflects the importance of party autonomy and the flexibility of arbitration as a means
of dispute resolution. But having done so, an expedited procedure will then become
the lens through which equal treatment and the ‘full opportunity’ to present one’s
case is viewed. Although the parties in CMNC v Jaguar Energy subsequently agreed
33 ibid [86].
34 ibid [86]–[104].
35 Ken Oliphant, ‘Against Certainty in Tort Law’ in Stephen GA Pitel, Jason W Neyers and Erika
Chamberlain (eds), Tort Law: Challenging Orthodoxy (Hart 2013) 18.
36 Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v Fairmount Development Pte Ltd [2007] SGCA 28, [2007] 3 SLR(R) 86
[65(d)] (VK Rajah JA).
37 ASM Shipping Ltd of India v TTMI Ltd of England [2005] EWHC 2238 (Comm), [2006] 2 All ER
(Comm) 122 [38] (Morison J).
38 CMNC v Jaguar Energy (n 2) [104(d)].
39 CMNC v Jaguar Energy (n 3) [130].
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to extend the deadlines beyond those originally set out in Clause 20.2 of the EPC
Contract, this aspect of the case indicates that an expedited procedure may be inap-
propriate where the dispute is a complex one raising a multitude of legal and/or evi-
dential issues. When agreeing the content of an arbitration clause, the promise of a
final resolution to a dispute within 3 or 6 months of the tribunal’s appointment is at-
tractive. But those shortened deadlines could prove a false economy in the long run,
especially where truncated procedures give rise to complaints that due process was
not followed and there is a subsequent attempt to set aside the award and/or resist
enforcement.
6 . A N O B L I G A T I O N T O A R B I T R A T E I N G O O D F A I T H ?
There has been an ongoing debate in a number of common law jurisdictions in re-
cent years over the role that good faith obligations should occupy in the context of
commercial contracts.40 In English law that debate has been heightened since the de-
cision of Leggatt J (as he then was) in Yam Seng Pte Ltd v International Trading
Corporation Ltd.41 Much of the focus has been on so-called ‘relational’ contracts and
the regulation long-term contractual relationships in the face of the indeterminacy of
written agreements.42 While a court will be likely to uphold express obligations to
act in good faith,43 the more pressing questions relate to the implication of good
faith terms. When should such terms be implied? Do they undermine the certainty
of written agreements? When is a contract a relational contract? Against that back-
drop, several observations can be made in relation to the good faith aspect of the
High Court judgment in CMNC v Jaguar Energy.
First, although the judge stated that he was prepared to ‘proceed on the basis that
Jaguar had an implied duty to arbitrate in good faith’,44 the relevance of good faith to
arbitration agreements has not been settled conclusively in Singapore as a result of
the case. The judgment offers a tentative conclusion rather than a statement of clear
and settled law. The discussion of good faith obligations should, moreover, be
treated as obiter dicta given that it was not essential for the decision.45 It is also
40 See, for example: William M Dixon, ‘Good Faith in Contractual Performance and Enforcement:
Australian Doctrinal Hurdles’ (2011) 39 Australian Bus L Rev 227; Daniele Bertolini,
‘Decomposing Bhasin v Hrynew: Towards an Institutional Understanding of the General Organizing
Principle of Good Faith in Contractual Performance’ (2017) 67 UTLJ 348; Michael Bridge, ‘Good faith,
the Common Law and the CISG’ (2017) 22 Unif L Rev 98; Severine Saintier, ‘The Elusive Notion of
Good Faith in the Performance of a Contract, Why Still a Bête Noire for the Civil and Common Law?’
[2017] JBL 441. See also the various articles appearing in the first issue of the Journal of Commonwealth
Law which are devoted to the subject of ‘Good Faith in Contract’: (2019) 1 J Commonwealth L,
<https://www.journalofcommonwealthlaw.org> accessed 1 June 2020.
41 [2013] EWHC (QB) 111, [2013] 1 All ER 1321.
42 David Campbell, ‘Good Faith and the Ubiquity of the “Relational” Contract’ (2014) 77 MLR 475; Hugh
Collins, ‘Is a Relational Contract a Legal Concept?’ in Simone Degeling, James Edelman and James
Goudkamp (eds), Contract in Commercial Law (Lawbook Co 2016).
43 HSBC Institutional Trust Services (Singapore) Ltd (trustee of Starhill Global Real Estate Investment Trust) v
Toshin Development Singapore Pte Ltd [2012] SGCA 48 [32]–[48] (VK Rajah JA) (Singapore);
Petromec Inc v Petroleo Brasileiro SA Petrobras (No 3) [2005] EWCA Civ 891, [2006] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 121
[115]–[121] (Longmore LJ) (England).
44 CMNC v Jaguar Energy (n 3) [196].
45 ibid [199].
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apparent that the judge was exercising caution given that Singapore law (as does
English law) rejects the idea of a general, overarching good faith obligation in rela-
tion to commercial contracts.46 It is fair to say that in both Singapore and England
the law is in a state of ‘flux’47 as regards the relationship between good faith and the
implication of contractual terms.
Second, drawing on a passage from Born’s International Commercial Arbitration,
the judge indicates two potential sources for a good faith obligation in relation to an
arbitration agreement. There is, first, ‘the nature of an agreement to arbitrate (‘the
specific ground’)’ and, then, ‘the general duty to perform contractual duties in good
faith based on the doctrine of pacta sunt servanda (‘the general ground’)’.48 The case
leaves open, however, the relationship between the two grounds and whether, for ex-
ample, the ‘specific ground’ is subsumed under the ‘general ground’. That said, the
context (including the case law referenced) suggests that, under Singapore law, the
source of a good faith obligation to arbitrate in good faith would most likely be a
term implied into the arbitration agreement in fact (rather than in law). In common
law jurisdictions such as England and Singapore where there is no recognition of a
general good faith obligation implied into contracts as a matter of law, much of the
ongoing debate concerns the circumstances in which it would be appropriate to im-
ply such a term in fact.
Third, the judge acknowledges one of the challenges of international commercial
arbitration: the question of governing law, including the law governing the arbitra-
tion agreement. In particular, the fact that there could be different approaches to the
implication of a good faith obligation depending on the law governing the arbitration
agreement.49 The judge avoids identifying the law governing the arbitration agree-
ment in question and, instead, speaks in general terms: ‘the answer will turn on the
interpretation of the arbitration agreement under the governing law of the same,
which will differ between arbitration agreements.’50 It is not clear from the judgment
whether the parties had expressly identified the law governing the arbitration agree-
ment. It would appear not. In absence of an express choice by the parties, there is,
however, reason to believe that New York law (rather than Singapore law) was the
correct law against which an implied contractual obligation to act in good faith
should have be judged.51
46 ibid [196].
47 The One Suites Pte Ltd v Pacific Motor Credit (Pte) Ltd [2015] SGCA 2 [44] (Andrew Phang Boon Leong
JA) (Singapore).
48 CMNC v Jaguar Energy (n 3) [195].
49 ibid [196]–[197].
50 ibid [196].
51 See CMNC v Jaguar Energy (n 3) [7], [8] and [10] identifying Singapore as the seat and New York law
as the law governing the matrix contracts. In the absence an express choice, the law governing an arbitra-
tion agreement would most likely be either the law governing the matrix contract (in this case, New
York) or the law of the seat (in this case, Singapore). The Singapore case of BCY v BCZ [2016] SGHC
249, [2017] 3 SLR 357 suggests that, when looking at an implied choice of law to govern an arbitration
agreement, the starting presumption is that the arbitration agreement will be governed by the same law
chosen by the parties to govern their contract. In this regard, BCY v BCZ follows the approach adopted
by the English Court of Appeal in Sulamérica Cia Nacional de Seguros SA v Enesa Engenharia SA [2012]
EWCA Civ 638, [2013] 1 WLR 102. For further discussion see Hoi Seng Victor Leong and Jun Hong
Tan, ‘The Law Governing Arbitration Agreements: BCY v BCZ and Beyond’ (2018) 30 SAcLJ 70. See
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Fourth, there is reference by the judge to Article 2 A(1) of the Model Law which
states that ‘In the interpretation of this Law, regard is to be had to its international
origin and to the need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance
of good faith’.52 Although observing that provision has not been introduced in
Singapore, the judge held that depending on the governing law a provision of such
Article 2 A(1) ‘may be relevant to whether the parties to an arbitration agreement
bear a duty to arbitrate in good faith’.53 The wording in Article 2 A(1) is, in sub-
stance, identical to an equivalent provision, Art 7(1), in the UN Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (the ‘CISG’) as well as a number of
other UNCITRAL texts.54 In each of those provisions, the text appears to be clear
that the concept of good faith is relevant to the way the Model Law or CISG, for ex-
ample, is interpreted, but without any indication that the reference to good faith is
relevant to the implication of contractual terms requiring good faith standards.
Several views have been expressed on the reference to good faith in Article 7(1)
CISG.55 On one view, Article 7(1) is simply an interpretative directive in relation to
the CISG and cannot be used to impose good faith obligations on contracts.56 On
another, the reference to good faith can be used more expansively. It has been ar-
gued, however, that there is only a ‘modest role’ for good faith in relation to con-
tracts governed by the CISG on account of the fact that the concept lacks content.57
All in all, that points to a limited role for good faith where Article 2 A(1) has been
adopted in the implementation of the Model Law. Before moving on, there is a final
point to observe here. Even if the least persuasive interpretation of the Model Law
Article 2 A were to prevail (ie the provision does impose on the parties an obligation
to arbitrate in good faith), a good faith obligation would be imposed by the law of
the seat rather than being a term implied in fact as part of the arbitration agreement
(which seems to be the approach taken in CMNC v Jaguar Energy.) Moreover, were
that unpersuasive interpretation of Article 2 A to be applied, there would be another
question which might present itself: would the good faith obligation imposed on the
parties as a result of Article 2 A take effect as an implied term within the arbitration
agreement, or would it be a free-standing, ‘non-contractual’ statutory obligation?58
also BNA v BNB and another [2019] SGCA 84. In April 2020, however, the English Court of Appeal in
Enka Insaat Ve Sanayi AS v OOO ‘Insurance Company Chubb’ [2020] EWCA Civ 574 departed from
Sulamérica and held that, for an implied choice of law to govern an arbitration agreement, the starting
presumption should be the law of the seat; it remains to be seen whether the Singapore courts will stick
with the Sulamérica approach or opt for the contrary approach adopted in Enka v Chubb. The UK
Supreme Court will hear an appeal in Enka v Chubb at the end of July 2020.
52 CMNC v Jaguar Energy (n 3) [198].
53 ibid [198].
54 Steven D Walt, ‘The Modest Role of Good Faith in Uniform Sales Law’ (2015) 33 BU Int’l LJ 37, 38–40.
55 Roy Goode, Herbert Kronke and Ewan McKendrick, Transnational Commercial Law: Text, Cases and
Materials (2nd edn, OUP 2015) paras 8.38–8.49.
56 Eg in one arbitral award it was held that, in relation to a transaction governed by the CISG, there were no
good faith obligations imposed on the parties, albeit that there may have been had the domestic law at
the supplier’s place of business (Germany) applied: ICC Arbitral Award 8611/1997, a summary of which
can be found in Ingeborg Schwenzer, Christina Fountoulakis and Mariel Dimsey, International Sales Law:
A Guide to the CISG (3rd edn, Hart 2019) 51.
57 Walt (n 54).
58 See the point made below in relation to the English Arbitration Act 1996, s 40.
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Fifth, it appears the bar has been set high when it comes to the question of
breach. The indication from CMNC v Jaguar Energy is that breach of the obligation
to arbitrate in good faith would take into two account things.59 The first is some
element of intention: ie the party in breach of its good faith obligation would
have acted with the clear intention of disrupting the proceedings. In other words,
actions that we would be likely to label as bad faith conduct. Second, the relevant
party’s conduct would have a significant adverse impact on the arbitral proceedings:
ie the conduct in question would have to be something that was far from trivial. If
the approach taken to the breach question by the High Court in CMNC v Jaguar
Energy is one that would apply across the board, it suggests that the situations in
which a good faith obligation is breached will be limited. That conclusion also sug-
gests that a good faith obligation in the arbitration context is likely to be narrow in
scope.60
Finally, in contrast to the ongoing good faith debate in the context of commercial
contracts, the key issue here is not so much the ‘existence’ of implied obligations to
arbitrate in good faith but their ‘utility’. For, even if one accepts that an arbitration
agreement does contain an implied good faith obligation, what is its practical rele-
vance? The question of good faith matters to commercial contracts given the close
link to contractual remedies: ie breach of a good faith obligation (indeed, any con-
tractual obligation) gives rise to a claim for damages and/or the right to terminate
the agreement. But a claim for damages where an arbitration agreement has been
breached, although available in principle, will play a minor or ancillary role at most.61
Moreover, the right to terminate the arbitration agreement is unlikely to be of much
interest to the non-breaching party; that party wants proper performance of the arbi-
tration agreement not its termination. The precise scope of an obligation to arbitrate
in good faith is open to debate,62 and Kannan Ramesh J’s presumption in CMNC v
Jaguar Energy may well be the catalyst for argument around this point in future cases
in Singapore. While that may be so, it is submitted here that what really matters in
practical terms is not the existence and/or extent of good faith obligations in the
context of an arbitration agreement, but rather the powers possessed by the tribunal
to deal with bad faith conduct and a willingness to exercise those powers. It is in-
structive that the duty imposed on parties to an arbitration by the (English)
Arbitration Act 1996 makes no mention of good faith: ‘The parties shall do all things
59 See the analysis of the facts relevant to the good faith point: CMNC v Jaguar Energy (n 3) [205]–[213].
60 Although space precludes argument in relation to the point, it is suggested here that an arbitration agree-
ment should not be regarded as a relational contract. For the contrary view, see Benedict Tompkins, ‘The
Duty to Participate in International Commercial Arbitration’ [2015] Int ALR 14, 15 and 20.
61 For a discussion of damages for breach of an arbitration agreement in the English law context, see Julio
Cesar Betancourt, ‘Damages for Breach of an International Arbitration Agreement under English
Arbitration Law’ (2018) 34 Arb Int 511. Betancourt’s article is focussed on breach of the negative aspect
of arbitration agreements (ie commencing litigation in the face of an arbitration agreement) rather than
the positive aspect (ie proper participation in the arbitral process).
62 Gary B Born, International Commercial Arbitration (2nd edn, Kluwer Law International 2014) 1262: ‘The
precise contours of the obligation to participate cooperatively and in good faith in the arbitral process are
unsettled.’
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necessary for the proper and expeditious conduct of the arbitral proceedings.’63 It
has, moreover, be held that the duty does not take effect as an implied contractual
term.64 But more than that, the duty is linked to the default powers in section 41
that the tribunal can exercise where a party does not comply with its section 40 obli-
gation. The powers that can be exercised by a tribunal in the face of bad faith con-
duct may be a more fruitful area of enquiry than debating what precisely it means for
parties to act in good faith in the conduct of an arbitration.
7 . C O N C L U S I O N
The decision of the Court of Appeal in CMNC v Jaguar Energy confirms in unequivo-
cal terms that the Singapore courts will be cautious about interfering with procedural
decisions made by an arbitral tribunal acting within its discretion. While decisions
concerning, for example, the disclosure of documents, the admissibility of evidence
or procedural timelines can violate due process and prejudice a party’s case, that is
unlikely to be so where there is a rational basis for those decisions. The standard is
that of the reasonable and fair-minded tribunal and a tribunal does not act unreason-
ably and unfairly merely because another tribunal (or, indeed, the judge viewing the
matter from the perspective of setting aside or enforcement proceedings) might have
reached a different conclusion on a procedural matter. And although the good faith
point—is there implied into an arbitration agreement the obligation to act in good
faith?—was not considered on appeal, questions remain over the practical signifi-
cance of the High Court’s obiter presumption. What is given with one hand in
accepting the existence of such an obligation may be taken by the other in setting
(what appears to be) a high threshold for breach. But not only that. Given the lim-
ited relevance of contractual remedies in this context, the more interesting questions,
it would seem, are about the powers available to arbitrators to restrain bad faith con-
duct and how those powers are exercised.
63 Section 40(2) goes on to say that the s 40(1) duty ‘includes—(a) complying without delay with any de-
termination of the tribunal as to procedural or evidential matters, or with any order or directions of the
tribunal, and (b) where appropriate, taking without delay any necessary steps to obtain a decision of the
court on a preliminary question of jurisdiction or law . . .’.
64 Elektrim SA v Vivendi Universal SA [2007] EWHC 11 (Comm), [2007] 2 All ER (Comm) 365 [123]–
[131] (Aikens J).
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